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In order to study memory of the final position of a 
smoothly moving target, Hubbard (e.g., Hubbard & Bha-
rucha, 1988) presented smooth stimulus motion and used 
motor responses. In contrast, Freyd (e.g., Freyd & Finke, 
1984) presented implied stimulus motion and used the 
method of constant stimuli. The same forward error was 
observed in both paradigms. However, the processes un-
derlying the error may be very different. When smooth 
stimulus motion is followed by smooth pursuit eye move-
ments, the forward error is associated with asynchronous 
processing of retinal and extraretinal information. In the 
absence of eye movements, no forward displacement is 
observed with smooth motion. In contrast, implied motion 
produces a forward error even without eye movements, 
suggesting that observers extrapolate the next target step 
when successive target presentations are far apart. Fi-
nally, motor responses produce errors that are not ob-
served with perceptual judgments, indicating that the 
motor system may compensate for neuronal latencies.
In his review of the literature on representational mo-
mentum, Hubbard (2005) presents two basic paradigms 
that have been used to investigate the localization of the 
final position of a moving target and concludes that
Even though Freyd and Finke (1984) and Hubbard and 
Bharucha [1988] used different methods of stimulus pre-
sentation and response collection, the results from these 
studies converged on the idea that memory for the final 
position of a moving target was displaced forward in the 
direction of target motion. (p. 824)
Contrary to Hubbard’s (2005) conclusions, I will show 
in this comment that the observed convergence is the re-
sult of an artifact related to the poor control of eye move-
ments in Hubbard and Bharucha (1988). Furthermore, I 
will present an alternative view suggesting that forward 
displacement arises partly from low-level processes, that 
more than a single process of extrapolation exists, and that 
each extrapolation process is specific to certain types of 
motion and responses. To begin with, I will briefly reca-
pitulate the major difference between the work of Jenni-
fer Freyd in the 1980s (e.g., Freyd & Finke, 1984, 1985; 
Freyd & Johnson, 1987) and that of Timothy Hubbard in 
the 1990s (e.g., Hubbard, 1995, 1996; Hubbard & Bharu-
cha, 1988).
In Freyd’s work (e.g., Freyd & Finke, 1984), observers 
were shown a succession of rectangles, and each rectangle 
was shown for about 250 msec at the same position; after a 
blank interval of 250 msec, it appeared at a new orientation 
that implied the rotation of the rectangle during the blank 
interval. After seeing three such stimuli, a fourth stimulus, 
the probe, was presented at an orientation that differed 
only slightly from the third, and the observers were asked 
to report whether the third and the fourth orientations of 
the stimuli were the same or not. The observers were more 
prone to accept probe stimuli that had been rotated slightly 
further as being in the same orientation, indicating a for-
ward error. The stimuli created by Freyd may be referred 
to as implied motion stimuli, and she used the method of 
constant stimuli that involved a symbolic response, with 
an arbitrary mapping between response and perceptual 
content (e.g., pressing one of two buttons). Most of the 
subsequent work on representational momentum has used 
Freyd’s methodology, even if the stimulus type and the 
target’s trajectory have been changed (for a sample of re-
cent research, see Thornton & Hubbard, 2002).
In Hubbard’s work (e.g., Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), 
observers were shown a smoothly moving target that resem-
bled real motion. The target moved on a linear trajectory 
and disappeared suddenly. The observers’ task was to adjust 
a mouse cursor so that it corresponded to the remembered 
final position, which involved a nonarbitrary relationship 
between the motor response and the perceptual content.
The results of Hubbard’s and Freyd’s paradigms con-
verged, in that both studies reported displacement of the 
final target position in the direction of target motion (for-
ward displacement). However, more recent studies have 
shown that this convergence is due to the complex interac-
tion between the three factors of motion type (implied vs. 
smooth), eye movements (smooth pursuit vs. fixation), 
and response mode (motor response vs. buttonpress). 
Table 1 presents an overview of the three factors and spec-
ifies which conditions produce forward displacement and 
which do not. Importantly, the smooth motion stimuli used 
by Hubbard produce forward displacement only when ob-
servers track the stimulus with their eyes. The table will be 
explained in detail in three subsequent sections.
Why Previous Results Obtained With Smooth 
Stimulus Motion Are Inconclusive: The Role of 
Eye Movements
In the first section of this comment, I will deal with 
studies in which smooth stimulus motion on a computer 
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monitor that resembled real motion has been used (e.g., 
Hubbard, 1995, 1996; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988): In 
these studies, smooth stimulus motion at a moderate 
(mostly smaller than 30 deg/sec) velocity was shown, no 
fixation point was presented, and observers were not given 
any explicit instructions about where to fixate. This made 
it highly likely that the observers pursued the target with 
their eyes. At target velocities below ~30 deg/sec, smooth 
pursuit eye movements may be used to keep the target in 
the region of highest acuity, the fovea (Robinson, Gordon, 
& Gordon, 1986), where it is much easier to see than in the 
periphery, due to the better spatial resolution. In contrast, 
implied motion is not sufficient to sustain smooth pursuit 
eye movements (Churchland & Lisberger, 2000).
Neuronal latencies and the sensation time. The 
study of localization errors associated with smooth pur-
suit eye movements has a long history. The earliest stud-
ies were concerned with the mislocalization of a flash 
during smooth pursuit eye movements. In the 1920s, 
Hazelhoff and Wiersma (1924) developed a paradigm 
based on smooth pursuit to measure the sensation time of 
a stimulus. They argued that there is a minimal time for 
the perception of a stimulus (sensation time) and that the 
distance covered by the eyes during this time interval may 
be used to estimate the duration of the sensation time. In 
their experiments, Hazelhoff and Wiersma asked observ-
ers to follow a smoothly moving target with the eyes. At 
an unpredictable moment, they presented a flash while 
the smooth pursuit eye movement continued. It was noted 
that the perceived position of the flash was displaced in 
the direction of motion by a distance x. Because the eye 
moved at a velocity v while traversing the distance x, the 
authors reasoned that the signal representing the flash ar-
rived in the brain at the time t  x/v, which turned out to 
be on the order of 100 msec, regardless of target velocity. 
A large number of more recent studies have confirmed 
Hazelhoff and Wiersma’s observations (Brenner, Smeets, 
& van den Berg, 2001; Metzger, 1932; Mita, Hironaka, & 
Koike, 1959; Mitrani & Dimitrov, 1982; Rotman, Brenner, 
& Smeets, 2004; van Beers, Wolpert, & Haggard, 2001) 
and have refined his argument in terms of sensation time 
(overview in Schlag & Schlag-Rey, 2002).
Although most of the studies of perception time have 
been concerned with the localization of flashes, the con-
cept may easily be applied to the localization of the end-
point of a moving target. It is known that smooth pursuit 
eye movements may not be stopped instantaneously but 
that the eye continues to move for about 300 msec after 
target disappearance (Mitrani & Dimitrov, 1978). The 
continuation of smooth pursuit after target offset will 
be referred to as oculomotor overshoot. Because the eye 
continues to move after a discrete event (i.e., target disap-
pearance), Hazelhoff and Wiersma’s (1924) logic may be 
applied to endpoint localization: The distance covered by 
the eyes during the time it takes to consciously notice the 
disappearance of the target results in a localization error, 
because when the sudden event is registered, it will be as-
sociated with the current position of the eyes, and not with 
the eye position at physical target offset (see Figure 1). In 
accord with this idea, it has been observed that the size of 
the oculomotor overshoot and the mislocalization of the 
endpoint are closely coupled. The oculomotor overshoot 
decreases when the target disappearance is more probable, 
because the target reaches the end of a trajectory (Mitrani 
& Dimitrov, 1978) or because target disappearance can 
be voluntarily controlled (Stork, Neggers, & Müsseler, 
2002). Similarly, the mislocalization decreases toward the 
end of the trajectory (Mitrani & Dimitrov, 1978) and when 
the target disappearance can be voluntarily controlled 
(Stork & Müsseler, 2004).
In addition to the timing error between retinal (target 
disappearance) and extraretinal (perceived eye position, 
oculomotor commands) signals, purely retinal factors may 
contribute to the mislocalization of the target endpoint. As 
is shown in Figure 1, the current gaze position after ocu-
lomotor overshoot is displaced in the direction of motion. 
That is, the fovea is directed at a position beyond the final 
position of the moving target. Because there is a tendency 
to mislocalize objects toward the fovea (Kerzel, 2002b; 
Sheth & Shimojo, 2001), the final target position will be 
displaced in the direction of motion. Finally, the possi-
bility cannot be ruled out that the target is subjectively 
perceived beyond the physical disappearance point, due to 
visible persistence of the target (Kerzel, 2000).
In sum, there are a number of reasons for the displace-
ment of the final position with a smoothly moving target 
that is pursued with the eyes. Although the argument from 
neuronal latencies (sensation time) definitely precludes 
high-level factors, high-level factors such as expecta-
tions about the future trajectory of the target may influ-
ence smooth pursuit eye movements (Krauzlis & Stone, 
1999). As was illustrated above, there is a close coupling 
between smooth pursuit and mislocalization of the final 
target position. When the eye velocity, v, during the period 
of oculomotor overshoot is reduced, the displacement of 
the final position will be reduced, under the assumption 
that the neuronal latency, t, is constant: x  t * v. Thus, any 
factor that will reduce eye velocity will also reduce dis-
placement. For instance, smooth pursuit eye movements 
will slow down before a predictable reversal of target di-
Table 1
Overview of Three Factors That Influence the 
Occurrence of Forward Displacement (FD)
Motion Type
 Eye Movement  Response  Smooth  Implied  
Smooth pursuit FD n/a
Eye fixation Verbal No FD FD
   Motor  FD  FD  
Note—Smooth pursuit eye movements may be sustained only by smooth 
stimulus motion, not by implied motion. Smooth motion looks real, 
whereas implied motion shows a target separated by large spatiotem-
poral gaps. A verbal response mode involves a symbolic response that 
indicates the content of perception (left of, right of ), whereas a motor 
response involves a nonarbitrary relation between response (e.g., point-
ing) and the content of perception.
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rection, and therefore, forward displacement will also be 
reduced (Kerzel, 2002a). Or, when the eye velocity is zero 
during eye fixation, forward displacement is entirely sup-
pressed (see, e.g., Baldo, Kihara, Namba, & Klein, 2002; 
Kerzel, 2000; Kerzel, Jordan, & Müsseler, 2001; Whitney 
& Cavanagh, 2002; Whitney, Murakami, & Cavanagh, 
2000).
Let us consider the relation between internalized phys-
ics,1 eye movements, and displacement more formally. We 
have two premises (A and B) and one conclusion (C):
A. High-level processes, such as internalized physics or 
expectations about stimulus motion (for a complete listing 
of high-level factors, see Hubbard, 2005).
B. Smooth pursuit eye movements.
C. Forward displacement of the final position of a smoothly 
moving target.
Hubbard’s (2005) argument is that high-level factors 
produce forward displacement with smooth stimulus 
 motion—that is, AC (i.e., when A, then C)—but he did 
not control for smooth pursuit eye movements ( B), and 
one may assume that in all of his experiments, B was si-
multaneously present. Therefore, BC is also possible. 
When smooth pursuit eye movements were suppressed 
(no B) in some of my studies (Kerzel, 2000; Kerzel et al., 
2001), the first real test of AC was performed with 
smooth stimulus motion: Suppressing smooth pursuit 
does not affect internalized physical laws and expecta-
tions about future target motion. However, displacement 
(C) was not obtained under these conditions. Thus, it has 
to be concluded that high-level processes ( A) are not 
sufficient to produce forward displacement of a smoothly 
moving target ( C). Rather, the actual causal chain is 
more likely to be BC.
However, it is not easy to dismiss the hypothesis that 
high-level processes ( A) are necessary for smooth pur-
suit eye movement ( B), because smooth pursuit eye 
movements are always predictive in nature and prediction 
is a high-level process (Krauzlis & Stone, 1999). There-
fore, eye movements ( B) cannot be completely sepa-
rated from expectations and predictions ( A). Given the 
prominent role of prediction in motor control, one may 
try to save Hubbard’s (2005) argument by claiming that 
ABC, so that a high-level process ( A) would be 
ultimately responsible for the displacement. The prob-
lem with this idea is that it is unclear where to stop the 
causal chain of nonsufficient but necessary factors. For 
instance, the subject would have never localized the target 
if he or she had not been motivated to do so. Obviously, 
motivation is necessary to obtain displacement, but not 
sufficient. Thus, one may conclude that the subject’s mo-
tivation ( M) is the ultimate cause of the displacement: 
MABC. It is obvious that this reasoning does not 
advance our understanding of the processes underlying 
displacement. Therefore, it may be best to restrict the 
causal chain to necessary and sufficient factors. Extend-
ing the causal chain to factors that are necessary but not 
sufficient makes the argument arbitrary.
Effects of velocity, friction, and centripetal force 
with smooth motion. Basically, all the studies in which 
localization of the endpoint of a smoothly moving target 
during eye fixation and with smooth pursuit eye move-
ments has been compared have reported differences be-
tween these conditions. In the most basic version, Kerzel 
(2000; Kerzel et al., 2001) found that the final position 
of a target moving smoothly on a linear trajectory was 
displaced in the direction of motion during smooth pursuit 
eye movements and that forward displacement increased 
with increasing velocity. During fixation, there was no 
forward displacement and no increase of displacement 
with increasing velocity. Effects of velocity are typically 
considered to be a robust piece of evidence in favor of 
representational momentum (Freyd & Finke, 1985), be-
cause the momentum of an object is jointly determined by 
its mass and velocity.2 The absence of effects of velocity 
during fixation poses a major challenge for an account 
in terms of internalized physics because the “physical” 
content of the scene remains unaltered. In contrast, an 
eye-movement-based explanation may easily explain ef-
fects of velocity during smooth pursuit with reference to 
the equation given above: displacement  constant de-
lay * velocity. When the eye does not move during fixa-
tion, no displacement is expected with smooth motion, 
because the eye velocity equals zero.
Furthermore, Hubbard reported that forward displace-
ment decreased when the moving target made contact 
with an adjacent surface and that forward displacement 
decreased even further when the moving object made con-
Figure 1. Asynchronous processing of retinal and extraretinal 
input. Gaze direction is indicated by upward pointing arrows. Ini-
tially, the eye pursues the target (an asterisk) by smooth pursuit 
eye movements. Unpredictably, the target disappears at Time 1. 
While the target continues to move (oculomotor overshoot), the 
signal indicating that the target has disappeared is transmitted. 
Three important stages—the eye, the corpus geniculatum laterale 
(CGL) in the thalamus, and the primary visual cortex (V1)—are 
shown. At Time 2, the eyes receive the signal that the target is no 
longer present; at Time 3, this signal has reached the CGL; and 
at Time 4, the signal arrives in the cortex. During Times 1–4, the 
target has moved the distance x at the velocity v, so that the trans-
mission time equals t  x/v. Note that gaze (i.e., the foveated posi-
tion) is directed at a position ahead of the final target location, so 
that a bias to localize the target toward the fovea will also result 
in a forward bias.
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tact with two objects (Hubbard, 1997, 1998). The inter-
pretation of this effect was that the contact between the 
moving object and the surface implied friction and that 
the mental representation of friction reduced forward dis-
placement. However, the presence of more than one object 
may have distracted the observers’ eye movements, so that 
they either did not follow the target or did so at a lower 
eye velocity. It is well known that a structured background 
reduces the velocity of smooth pursuit (Collewijn & Tam-
minga, 1984). In accord with such an interpretation, the 
observers could easily have switched between a strategy 
of following the target and one of looking at the friction 
surface. A reduction of forward displacement was found in 
the latter, but not in the former, condition (Kerzel, 2002a). 
Thus, it may be that effects of a cluttered visual display on 
eye movements, and not the associated physical implica-
tions, reduced forward displacement.
In addition to representational momentum and repre-
sentational friction, Hubbard (1996) reported displace-
ment consistent with centripetal force: When a target 
moving on a circular trajectory suddenly disappeared, 
displacement was in the direction of motion and toward 
the center of the circular trajectory (inward displacement). 
Again, the stimulus was appropriate for smooth pursuit 
eye movements. In a close replication of Hubbard’s (1996) 
study, eye movements were recorded while observers pur-
sued the target on a circular trajectory (Kerzel, 2003b). 
It was observed that the eyes continued on the circular 
trajectory after target disappearance; that is, the final eye 
position was displaced forward and toward the center of 
the circular trajectory (inward), thereby mirroring the lo-
calization error.
Overall, there is ample evidence that studies reporting 
effects of internalized analogues of momentum, friction, 
and centripetal force with smooth stimulus motion may 
rather reflect modulations of smooth pursuit eye move-
ments induced by the displays. In fact, there is no recent 
evidence that would suggest the opposite. Furthermore, I 
do not think that oculomotor effects add to or modulate 
displacement arising from higher level effects, such as in-
ternalized physics, expectations, landmark attraction, or 
motion source. Hubbard (2005) suggests that all of these 
factors may jointly determine the pattern of displacement. 
For instance, displacement may be larger when the tar-
get moves toward a landmark, because landmark attrac-
tion and representational momentum add up, and smaller 
when it moves away from the landmark, because land-
mark attraction and representational momentum cancel 
out (Hubbard & Ruppel, 1999). Data from my own lab 
do not support the view that the effects of eye movements 
will add up with any of the hypothesized mechanisms 
(internalized momentum, friction, centripetal force) ob-
served with smooth stimulus motion. Rather, the data sug-
gest that these mechanisms simply do not exist. This may 
explain why the effects of friction and centripetal force 
have not yet been replicated with implied motion, where 
smooth pursuit eye movements are not possible. In con-
trast to smooth motion, implied motion produces forward 
displacement even during fixation.
Forward Displacement Occurs With Implied 
Motion: The Role of Apparent Motion Perception
In the studies of Freyd and co-workers, there were large 
spatial and temporal gaps between successive presenta-
tions of the target that made smooth pursuit eye move-
ments impossible. To vary the velocity of target motion, 
the time interval between successive presentations was 
reduced from 900 to 100 msec (Freyd & Finke, 1985). An 
increase in forward displacement was observed when the 
time interval was reduced, and the interpretation was that 
the increased velocity of the stimulus increased represen-
tational momentum, because momentum equals the prod-
uct of mass and velocity. As was pointed out earlier, for-
ward displacement and the effects of velocity with implied 
motion do not depend on eye movements. In contrast, the 
effects of velocity on forward displacement and forward 
displacement itself are absent with smooth motion during 
eye fixation (Kerzel, 2003b; Kerzel et al., 2001).
Internalized physics can explain neither the difference 
between smooth and implied motion nor the difference be-
tween fixation and pursuit, because the underlying physi-
cal properties (i.e., target velocity) are unchanged. Fur-
thermore, the effects of velocity with implied motion may 
exemplify a fundamental problem associated with the idea 
of internalized physics in dynamic events. As is shown in 
Figure 2, the idea summarized in Hubbard’s (2005) review 
is that properties of the stimulus are represented mentally 
after an initial perceptual analysis and that the represented 
properties of the stimulus influence the remembered tar-
get position at a late stage of processing. For instance, the 
velocity or the identity of an object (e.g., a fast-moving 
rocket or a stationary church) is represented mentally and 
influences the representation of the final target position. 
However, one may also put forth the alternative view that 
all the effects of the stimulus influence only motion per-
ception and that the displacement of the final target po-
sition depends solely on the goodness of the perceived 
motion. For instance, the effect of velocity reported by 
Freyd and Finke (1985) may reflect the fact that appar-
ent motion is best perceived at shorter intervals between 
successive presentations of the target (~100 msec) and 
degrades when the interval is prolonged (Graham, 1965; 
Neuhaus, 1930). In other words, target velocity and the 
goodness of apparent motion perception were completely 
confounded in Freyd and Finke (1985), so that improved 
goodness of apparent motion, and not increased speed, 
may have produced stronger forward displacement at high 
velocities (i.e., shorter intervals).
Similarly, in studies that have reported the effects of 
the typical motion associated with an object on memory 
displacement (larger displacement for a more dynamic 
object; Reed & Vinson, 1996), the effects may have been 
mediated by apparent motion perception. Nagai and Yagi 
(2001) demonstrated that this effect was due to the differ-
ent shapes of objects: Pointed objects elicited larger for-
ward displacement, regardless of the associated dynamics 
(but see Cooper & Munger, 1993; Vinson & Reed, 2002). 
The underlying source of the effect of pointedness may be 
that the perception of apparent motion is stronger when 
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the object points in the direction of apparent motion than 
when the direction of the point and the direction of mo-
tion are in conflict (McBeath, Morikawa, & Kaiser, 1992). 
Similarly, the reduction of forward displacement observed 
when the shape of an object was changed in a sequence of 
apparent motion stimuli (Kelly & Freyd, 1987) may have 
been due to the reduced impression of apparent motion, 
rather than to higher level factors, such as object continuity.
Thus, for any manipulation for which a modulation of 
forward displacement with implied motion is reported, 
there is a risk that the effects were mediated—and poten-
tially, caused—by effects on motion perception. Strong 
support for such an idea was provided in a study in which 
the step size between successive target presentations was 
manipulated, whereas target velocity was held constant 
(Kerzel, 2003c): When the spatiotemporal steps between 
successive target presentations were small and smooth 
motion resulted, forward displacement was absent. When 
the size of the spatiotemporal steps was increased and ap-
parent motion resulted, forward displacement increased 
and was maximal with the implied motion used by Freyd. 
Because step size is related to motion perception (real vs. 
apparent motion), but not to any physical principle, the in-
ternalized physics approach has difficulty explaining this 
result. Rather, this result suggests that forward displace-
ment occurs only with apparent motion. The reason may 
be that observers automatically extrapolate the next step 
in a sequence of target steps and that attention moves to 
this next step (Kerzel, 2003a). If an implied motion stimu-
lus is presented, the next logical target step after target 
offset is large, so that observers will end up far beyond the 
true final position. This may result in a larger error than 
is shown when observers extrapolate a small step with 
smooth stimulus motion.
Support for this idea comes from a study showing that 
the ease of extrapolation and the size of the forward error 
are related: The more difficult it was to extrapolate the 
next step in an implied motion sequence, the smaller was 
the forward error (Munger & Minchew, 2002). It should 
also be noted that previous studies in which the error 
during an explicit extrapolation task has been looked at 
(Finke & Freyd, 1985; Finke & Shyi, 1988) are irrelevant 
for the above-mentioned hypothesis: When asked to ex-
trapolate the next logical position in a sequence of implied 
motion, observers made an error opposite to the direction 
of motion (i.e., the extrapolated distance was too short). 
Because of the conflicting sign of the error in extrapola-
tion and endpoint localization, it was concluded that two 
different processes were at work. However, my hypothesis 
has been that observers automatically extrapolate and that 
the (attentional) overshoot causes a bias in endpoint lo-
calization. The hypothesis is not that observers mistake 
the extrapolated position for the final target position. The 
confusion of the final target position and the extrapolated 
next position is highly unlikely, because the large separa-
tion between successive steps (typically about 2º) is easy 
to discriminate. Therefore, errors in motion extrapolation 
are completely irrelevant for endpoint localization, since 
the assumption is that observers’ memory for the final 
target position is biased toward the extrapolated position, 
and not that they confound the two positions.
From a functional point of view, it may be that extrapo-
lation with implied motion reflects the necessity to predict 
where an object that is temporarily hidden from view will 
reappear. For instance, prey in the forest may be temporar-
ily hidden from view by trees or bushes. This results in ap-
parent motion of the prey. To intercept the prey, the preda-
tor will have to move to positions beyond the presently 
available stimulation, so that being able to extrapolate the 
next position is an advantage, even if it results in erro-
neous localization of the last-seen position. In contrast, 
prey that is continuously visible and suddenly disappears 
Figure 2. Two possible routes by which the effects of shape, interstimu-
lus interval (ISI), and trajectory may influence the mental representa-
tion of target position. (A) In the classical conception, these attributes 
are perceived, and the representation of these attributes influences the 
mental representation of target position. (B) Alternatively, it may be that 
the three stimulus attributes exert an influence on motion perception 
and that motion perception determines the mental representation of 
target position. For instance, shortening the ISI of an implied motion 
stimulus may not influence the perceived velocity of the target but may 
influence the quality of the perceived apparent motion.
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may “freeze,” whereby it tries to visually fuse with the 
background. Therefore, it may be important to reliably es-
timate the final target position, rather than to extrapolate 
the next position with smoothly moving objects. In sum, 
the localization errors observed with perceptual measures 
may reflect different environmental constraints associated 
with these motion types.
Forward Displacement Depends on the Response 
Mode and Is Larger With Motor Responses
So far, I have examined effects of eye movements and 
motion type that clearly distinguish the effects observed 
in the paradigms developed by Freyd (e.g., Freyd & 
Finke, 1984) and Hubbard (e.g., Hubbard & Bharucha, 
1988). One final difference between the two paradigms 
is the nature of the response mode: Freyd used symbolic 
judgments about what observers remembered, whereas 
Hubbard used mouse pointing to the final target posi-
tion. In an influential neurophysiological theory, Goodale 
and Milner (1992) have claimed that visual information 
for perception is treated in a different cortical pathway 
than is visual information for action. This idea predicts 
differences between psychophysical methods that do not 
involve motor action, such as the method of constant 
stimuli, and methods that use motor responses, such as 
pointing or grasping.
Consistent with such a notion, Kerzel and Gegenfurtner 
(2003) found forward displacement of the final position 
of a smoothly moving target when observers had to point 
to the final target position, but not when the observers 
judged its position relative to a probe stimulus (for similar 
results, see Ashida, 2004). The latter condition replicates 
the results presented in the section on eye movements. 
Thus, the results obtained with Hubbard’s paradigm con-
founded two different localization errors: one due to eye 
movement, and the other due to forward extrapolation in 
the motor system. This multitude of processes responsible 
for one and the same observable error pattern is difficult 
to explain from the point of view of internalized physics: 
Why should the motor system, the system for the percep-
tion of apparent motion, and the eye movement system 
have internalized physical principles, but not the system 
responsible for the perception of smooth motion? After 
all, smooth motion is the dominant motion type in the en-
vironment, given that each movement of the eyes or the 
head is accompanied by continuous motion.
It appears much more plausible that the isolatable 
sources of errors subserve different functions. Extrapola-
tion with apparent motion may be helpful when obstacles 
block the view, and extrapolation in the motor system may 
overcome the problem of neuronal latencies. As has been 
pointed out by Nijhawan (1994), the visual system does 
not have access to real-time information about the envi-
ronment. In order not to lag behind, which is particularly 
problematical with moving objects, the visual system has 
to compensate for neuronal processing delays. Nijhawan 
later suggested that neuronal delays are compensated for 
at an early stage: The perceived position of smoothly mov-
ing objects is extrapolated into the direction of motion at 
the perceptual level; that is, observers see the target ahead 
of the currently transmitted position (Nijhawan, 2002). 
This explains why a briefly flashed stationary object is 
seen to lag behind a moving object (Nijhawan, 1994) but 
fails to explain why there is no perceptual overshoot of 
the moving object at the end of the trajectory (Eagle-
man & Sejnowski, 2000; Nijhawan, 1992). In contrast to 
the early-compensation hypothesis, extrapolation in the 
motor system (Ashida, 2004; Kerzel, 2003c; Kerzel & 
Gegenfurtner, 2003) suggests that neuronal latencies may 
be compensated for at a late stage of visual processing: 
Observers may point or reach too far into the direction of 
motion in order not to be late, even if the position informa-
tion available to conscious perception is not distorted.
Is Auditory Representational Momentum a 
Problem for the Current Account?
In two recent reports, it was observed that the final posi-
tion of a smoothly moving auditory target was mislocalized 
in the direction of motion (Getzmann, 2005; Getzmann, 
Lewald, & Guski, 2004). One of these reports compared 
localization of the final position of an auditory target after 
observers pursued the target with their eyes and its local-
ization during eye fixation (Getzmann, 2005). In contrast 
to the above-cited studies on the localization of visual tar-
gets, no difference between the smooth pursuit and the 
fixation condition emerged. Forward displacement was of 
equal magnitude, regardless of eye movement condition. 
However, a motor task was used to localize the auditory 
targets, which may explain why forward displacement was 
observed with fixation (see above). Otherwise, these re-
sults are in strong contrast to visual localization, where the 
forward error was found to disappear with eye fixation and 
smooth motion. The question is whether this supports the 
notion that higher level and, presumably, supramodal pro-
cesses, such as representational momentum, are responsible 
for the forward error. In my view, the answer is no, because a 
supramodal process should produce the same error patterns 
in different modalities, but this is obviously not the case. 
Therefore, specialized and modality-dependent processes 
are much more likely to cause the forward error than is a 
unifying, high-level process at the cognitive level.
Concluding Remarks
In sum, recent research suggests that results obtained 
with smooth motion have to be reexamined, because the 
observed displacement pattern may reflect more than one 
process and partly low-level processes: the asynchronous 
processing of retinal and extraretinal information during 
smooth pursuit, or a tendency to extrapolate the next posi-
tion of a moving object in the motor system. With implied 
motion, eye movements do not play a role, but the pre-
viously reported effects of interstimulus interval or ob-
ject identity may be caused by the goodness of apparent 
motion, and not by a cognitive representation of stimulus 
characteristics. Taken together, more than one process of 
extrapolation exists, and future studies should try to neatly 
separate between these different processes. For instance, 
researchers should avoid measuring the effects of eye 
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movements and motor responses in an uncontrolled fash-
ion, because the results cannot be attributed unequivocally 
to any of the processes involved. Nonetheless, future re-
search may reveal that the different processes identified in 
this article may obey the same computational principles or 
feed into a common representation (see, e.g., Erlhagen & 
Jancke, 2004); however, it appears unlikely that physical 
principles will play a major role.
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NOTES
1. In Hubbard’s notion of internalization, physical principles or naive 
physics have become part of our cognitive architecture. The level of cog-
nition is referred to as high level. This is different from the idea that the 
dynamics of our visual world have been incorporated into that architec-
ture or our motor system, which is sometimes referred to as embodied 
cognition (Jordan, 2000a, 2000b). The errors incurred during smooth 
pursuit and pointing tasks may actually be considered a case of embodied 
cognition (Kerzel, 2005).
2. Effects of mass have been notoriously difficult to obtain with 
smooth (Hubbard, 1997) and implied (Cooper & Munger, 1993) mo-
tion. This has led researchers to abandon the literal metaphor of repre-
sentational momentum. Rather, representational momentum and other 
internalized regularities may combine with other high-level factors, such 
as expectations. Also, the internalized regularities may not be physical 
laws but naive conceptions about the physical world (Hubbard, 2005).
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